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Abstract—We propose a hierarchical cooperative response
framework for containment of value-changing attacks in large-
scale hierarchical critical infrastructures. We define a notion
of attack container, which is a logical entity that captures the
behavior of a group of nodes and aims to contain the damage of
the attack. This entity is a basic entity that is used for distributed
attack detection and cooperative response in our framework. The
simulation results show that our scheme can mitigate and contain
large-scale attacks very fast.
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical Infrastructure is defined as “systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that
their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters.” [1].
Industry sectors such as power grid, telecommunication,
transportation and financial systems are considered critical in-
frastructures, which offer a wide variety of important services
that our society relies on. It is a fact that these critical services
are supported by large-scale computer information systems.
Although in supporting roles, these systems are so important
that losses of them lead to the reduction or even disruption of
the critical infrastructure services.
Unfortunately, these computer information systems are vul-
nerable to cyber-attacks as they move from isolated systems
with propriety protocols to systems with COTS components.
Many threats and vulnerabilities have been reported [2]. Even
worse, many critical infrastructures are interdependent. For
example, transportation management systems will be disrupted
if there is a wide loss of power. Another example could be a
loss of the communication service leading to the disruption of
other information systems such as financial systems.
Our view of the computing critical infrastructure systems
is large-scale in nature and organized in multi-tier and hier-
archial structure1. We are particularly interested in the effect
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1This structure can be found in many critical infrastructure such as banking
and financial networks or energy-control networks [3][4][5].
of large-scale attacks through virus and worm propagation of
events in sensor networks where the leave nodes (e.g. sensing
digital devices) of the hierarchy get infected via external
attackers (e.g. through the maintenance of digital measurement
devices). Particularly, we will investigate an attack container
framework that will quickly detect, response to and contain
such attacks.
In the prior work, distributed detection has been an active
research areas. These techniques, such as those in [6][7][8]
are particularly interesting since they provide solutions for a
quick(est) event detection. However, they are parametric meth-
ods which require known probability distribution in advance.
Other non-parametric methods are useful as well even though
they usually address some specific changes such as mean-
changing or variance-changing detection [9][10].
Regarding worm and virus propagation and prevention,
there have been many results as well. In [11][12], epidemi-
ology is proposed for viral infection process. Some other
researchers have studied the immunization defense against
virus propagation [4].
The notion of “cooperative response” also has been consid-
ered. In [13], Nojiri considers an abstract model of “friends”
protocol where nodes somehow could detect that they are
compromised and warn their friends of the presence of the
worm. Virtually, there will be a race between alert propagation
and worm propagation through the network. However, how
to perform local detection and response are not given in
the paper. In [14], the author investigates “friends” protocol
under a hierarchical structure. However, they only consider
coordination between children and parent and do not consider
any peer-to-peer cooperation. In [15], the notion of cooperation
mechanism is generalized by two cooperative mechanisms:
“implicit signaling” in which malicious packets are marked
to alert other hosts and “explicit signaling’ which are alerts
exchanged among hosts.
Our approach to fast containment of viral or worm attacks
in large-scale hierarchical computing critical infrastructure is
to develop an attack container framework. This framework
includes distributed monitoring and detection, cooperative
response and mitigation. Distributed monitoring and detection
allow the system to quickly detect abnormal and critical events
happening in the field. Each node in the network plays a
monitoring role in the environment. We use a non-parametric
Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm for quick detection of
abrupt measurement changes in the environment. Furthermore,
we can also quantify the severity of the change. The ability
to detect and quantify events quickly enables a cooperative
response strategy to large-scale attacks. Based on the attack
severity, nodes act locally and inform others to mitigate and
contain the attacks before they can spread out to the whole
network. Due to the complexity and stochastic nature of the
systems, which is difficult to capture by analytical models, we
take the simulation approach. Our simulation results show that
our framework can contain the large-scale attacks effectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we give
our system models and assumption in section II. Then we
present our attack container framework in section III and the
detail of attack container in IV. We will give the detail of
our cooperative response protocol in section V. Section VI
show our simulation setup and results. Finally, we conclude
the paper in section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODELS & ASSUMPTIONS
A. Network Model
We model the underlying communication network of critical
infrastructure as a tree-like structure as shown in Figure 1.
Nodes are connected with their parent, siblings and children.
In this model, when we talk about “neighbors” of a node A, we
mean nodes that are in the same level and directly connected
with A.
Leave nodes in the tree are sensing nodes (called as
sensors). Sensors are digital devices attached to physical
measurement devices that capture the measurement value in
digital form and send this value to the higher level intermediate
digital nodes for control2. Other nodes in the network are
called intermediate nodes who receive and process data from
their children, alert their neighbors and parent if necessary.
They can also issue commands to their children to react to
special events.
Depending on the critical infrastructure, links between these
nodes can be either wired or wireless. For example, in the
Power networks, Intelligent Electronic Devices - IEDs (i.e.
sensors) communicate with Remote Terminal Units - RTUs
(i.e. intermediate nodes in second layer) by serial communi-
cation such as RS-232. RTUs can communicate with its parent,
Control Center by dedicated phone lines, radios or Wide Area
Networks [5][16][17].
For notation convenience, we denote children(x),
degree(y) as the set of children of node x and the degree of
node y.
B. Data Model
Data reported by sensors could be temperature, voltage
or water level. However, we assume that each correct data
2Here we consider sensors that are different from motes. Power-
consumption is not an issue.
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Fig. 1. Network Model
measurement reading has a range (min,max).
We model the reported data by sensors as random vari-
ables Xi whose mean is fixed under the normal condition.
Furthermore, we assume the mean are identical for all sensors.
It means we assume a homogenous environment in which
sensors have identical statistical behaviors. We denote µi, σi
as the mean and variance of Xi i.e. E[Xi], V ar[Xi] and a
range of (µmin, µmax) and (σmin, σmax). These ranges can
be calculated if we know the characteristics of the data.
Data is sampled and reported periodically. Each node in
the network expects to receive data from children periodically
and is expected to send data periodically. The period of data
reports may be different at different layers of the hierarchy.
For example, deadlines for reporting data from IEDs to RTUs
are 2-4 seconds [5]. Deadlines for upper layers may be longer
in the order of minutes.
C. Trust Assumptions
We assume all nodes except sensors are trusted. Specif-
ically, the operating systems are trusted and the software
running on these nodes is tampering-resistant. This can be
achieved with the support of hardware such as eXcute Only
Memory architecture (XOM) [18] or Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) [19]. These techniques basically can prevent modifi-
cations on executed software. However, they cannot prevent
Denial of Service attacks.
We also assume that all nodes except sensors will trust
each other. Since intermediate nodes are already trusted, this
assumption can be achieved by using secure communication
mechanism (authentication, encryption).
However, we assume weak security assumptions on sensor
nodes (e.g. no trusted software). These nodes can be compro-
mised and be used for some specific purposes. They can be
infected by viruses via external updates or they can just simply
fail and expose random behaviors.
D. Threats
1) External factors: Although the critical infrastructure
networks are usually isolated from open shared networks,
they get connected to external machines. (e.g. vendors do
software updates on sensing devices 3). These external updates
introduce threats for injecting flash worms into the system.
3Updating software from vendors can also be a threat. Since sensors are
proprietary devices, they are usually updated and maintained by vendors. If
the maintainer’s machine is infected, it could infect the sensors as well. [2]
2) Internal factors: Once a sensor is infected or com-
promised, it is fairly easy to infect neighbor nodes because
they can directly talk to each other due to a given protocol
distribution. This behavior can cause a dramatic spread of
worm in the network.
E. Attack/Failure Model
Once a sensor is infected or compromised through some
of the threats listed above, it will expose abnormal behaviors
on readings. The first type of attacks, value-changing attacks,
would be changing readings maliciously. Specifically, it could
report random readings due to infection or it could shift the
mean of reading values arbitrarily. We call the former attack
as random-changing attack and the latter as mean-changing
attack. The consequence of this type of attacks, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally, is reporting of malicious values
possibly leading to false alarms of the critical infrastructure
systems, inappropriate decisions of the operators or preferably
catastrophic failures of the critical infrastructure systems.
The second type of attacks would be changing reading
patterns to cause DoS(Denial of Service) or WoS (Withdrawal
of Service) where the readings can be flooded or delayed
arbitrarily. Although our framework enables the detection of
both types of attacks, we only consider the first type in this
paper.
F. Infection model
The infection process caused by external factors has a con-
stant rate α since it is independent with the number of infected
nodes and the underlying network topology. We model this
infection process as follows. The infection process happens as
if there were an agent that keeps infecting sensors one-by-one
randomly and uniformly. This is a reasonable model because
that agent (external vendor), intentionally or accidentally, just
“wants” to randomly choose one sensor to update/inject and
let the virus itself propagate through the internal network.
In contrasts, the infection process rate caused by internal
factors depends on the number of infected nodes and the
underlying network topology. To model this spreading behav-
ior, we adopt the epidemic models proposed by Kermack-
Mckendrick [20] in which a node has three states: “sus-
pectible”, “infectious” and “removed”. At the beginning, a
fraction of nodes is in “infectious” state while the rest of nodes
is in “suspectible” state. Once node is “removed”, it will not
be infected again. This is mainly because once a compromised
sensor is detected, it will be isolated until it is correctly
patched and becomes immune. Therefore, a node has either
the state transition “suspectible→ infectious→ removed′′
or stays in “suspectible” forever.
Since a sensor node can communicate with multiple neigh-
bors by multicast, we assume an infected sensor can choose
any subset of its neighbors to infect.
III. ATTACK CONTAINER FRAMEWORK
The goal of our system is monitoring, detecting and
isolating infected sensors as soon as possible, under com-
munication and false alarm rate constraints.
As mentioned in section II-E, we only consider value-
changing attacks. In the subsequent sections, first we will
show our approach to achieve the goals. Then, we give the
details of our attack container framework including protocols
and algorithms for monitoring, detection and response.
A. Attack Container
Attack Container is a logical entity, defined by a group,
that keeps track of the behavior of nodes in the group. It is
represented by a data structure and corresponding operations
(see section IV). The container data could be built from read-
ings of sensors or others’ attack container data. A monitoring
node builds its container from sensors’ readings. The root
of a tree can build the container by aggregating its children
containers and peers containers (see Figure 2). A more detail
of attack container construction and its operations will be given
in section IV.
Attack Container is a basic entity that will be used in our
distributed monitoring, detection and cooperative response in
our framework, which we will show next.
B. Approach
To deal with the value-changing infection attack in a large-
scale system, we use a distributed monitoring and detection
approach and a cooperative response strategy.
• Distributed Monitoring and Detection: Each interme-
diate node plays a monitoring role in the hierarchy. It
maintains an attack container for its sub-tree, which is
updated and aggregated on receiving either readings or
attack containers from the children. It performs a non-
parametric CUSUM on the attack container to detect
value-changing attacks. In this manner, the monitoring
and detection is distributed among nodes which enables
the fast detection capability.
• Cooperative Response Strategy: Once an intermediate
node detects a potential value-changing attack in its
subtree, it evaluates the severity and informs its neighbors
and parent nodes. If the severity is critical, it can solely
decide without waiting information from its parents and
peers.
The rate at which an intermediate node updates its
neighbors and parent on its subtree condition depends on
the severity of the event. However, the maximum rate is
limited appropriately to prevent a flooding of exchanged
messages among intermediate nodes during emergency
situation.
The coordination among nodes forms a cooperative re-
sponse strategy which enables early warning or a con-
tainment for a large-scale attack.
IV. OPERATIONS OF ATTACK CONTAINER
In our framework, an attack container is guided by a pair
of two metrics, abnormality and severity (see Figure 2 for
illustration) which are defined as follows.
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Fig. 2. An illustration of attack container and how it is used in the framework
A. Severity
A severity indicates how severe the attack happening in the
group in terms of sensor readings. Severity metric must be
aggregatable i.e. it is possible to compute a severity of a node
from other severities. To be precise, we define the severity of
a sensor and intermediate nodes as follows.
1) Severity of a sensor: A severity S(i) of a sensor i is
measured by the deviation of its mean and variance values
under attack from the mean and variance values in normal
condition. The reasons for using both mean and variance value
is that the mean can show the trend while the variance captures
random behaviors of the data.
To make the severity aggregatable, we normalize its to the
range of [0..1] as follows.
Let µ¯i, µi be the deviated mean, normal mean of Xi, the
values reported by sensor i.
S(i) = (µ¯i − µi)/(µmax − µmin)
With the assumption that µ¯i can only be greater than µi,
S(i) can take only values from [0..1].
The variance can be taken into account of the severity
similarly.
2) Severity of an intermediate node: A severity of an
intermediate node k is an average of severity of its children.
Formally,
S(k) =
∑
j∈children(k)
S(j)/|children(k)| (1)
Apparently, S(k) also takes only values from [0..1].
It is now becoming obvious that severity could be aggre-
gatable by the above definition.
B. Abnormality
An abnormality A(i) of an intermediate node i is the
fraction of abnormal children in the subtree over the total
number of its children. Formally,
A(i) =
∑
j∈children(i)
A(j)/|children(k)| (2)
It is fairly easy to see that the abnormality metric is in the
range [0..1] and is aggregatable.
C. Aggregation Operation
The aggregation operation of an attack container is defined
as in Equation 1 and Equation 2.
D. Value-Changing Detection and Cumulative Sum Monitor-
ing Box (CMB)
The core of the container attack is the monitoring operation,
which is done by Cumulative Sum Monitoring Box (CMB).
A CMB is used to monitor the changes of a data stream.
It processes the data stream and generates alerts based on
two thresholds: abnormal threshold and critical threshold,
which are set during the setup phase. The CMB could return
“normal” if no change in data stream is detected, “abnormal”
if the change exceeds abnormal threshold and “critical” if the
change exceeds critical threshold. The illustration of CMB is
shown in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. CUSUM Monitoring Box
CMB uses non-parametric Cumulative SUM change-
detection algorithm as its value-changing detection algorithm.
Essentially, the Cumulative Sum Change-Point keeps the pos-
itive part of the log-likelihood ratio and triggers an alarm if
the cumulation exceeds the threshold. The threshold is set
according to the required false alarm rate. The non-parametric
version extends the parametric method by estimating the
changes based on historical observation. Due to limit of space,
we will not discuss further here. The detail of non-parametric
algorithm could be found in [10] (Chapter 4) and [9].
According to the space requirement of the CMB and
CUSUM algorithm, a CMB needs to maintain two thresholds
and internal counter. This requires little space of memory. The
non-parametric CUSUM change-detection is also very light-
weight in terms of computation. These two characteristics are
important for the use of CMB in large-scale networks.
For notation convenience, we denote CMB(S) as the
current state of the data stream S.
V. COOPERATIVE RESPONSE PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe in detail the protocol to perform
distributed monitoring and detection and cooperative response
strategy.
To enable the cooperative response, each intermediate node
i keeps two attack containers: one for its children and the
other one for its peers. We denote them as Cchildren(i) and
Cpeers(i), respectively.
For each attack container (i.e. either Cchildren(i) or
Cpeers(i)), the two abnormality A(t) and severity S(t) streams
of the container will be given to two CMB boxes CMB(A(t))
and CMB(S(t)) for monitoring and detection. Therefore, in
total, each node i has four CMB boxes for monitoring and
detection.
On receiving any attack container data or readings from
children or peers, intermediate node i aggregates and updates
its attack containers Cchildren(i) and Cpeers(i) accordingly.
The behavior of node i depends on the states returned from
the four CMB boxes, which are defined as follows.
• If all CMB boxes indicate “NORMAL”, node i just
operates normally. It sends its attack container to its
parent and peers periodically at a default reporting rate. If
the reporting rates are higher than the default ones due to
some previous adjustment, it reduces the rates additively.
• If any box indicates “ABNORMAL” and the others indi-
cates “NORMAL”, the node’s state transits to “ABNOR-
MAL” state. It doubles the reporting rates to the parent
and peers.
The reason for this behavior is that the “ABNORMAL”
state only indicates there is a minor unusual behavior of
children and peers. The node only needs to be more active
in reporting its condition.
• If any box indicates “CRITICAL”, the node’s state transit
to “CRITICAL”. It is mainly because there is either a
large number of sensors are abnormal or the the reported
readings are very unusual. This is likely to be a starting
point for a large-scale attack.
On this transition, the node first sends “ALERT” message
to its children which basically tells them to block any
external access to avoid getting infected. Then, it also
sends an “ALERT” message attached with its attack
container to its parent and peers.
It is important to emphasize that when an intermediate
node receives an “ALERT” message, it will not be alerted
immediately. A node only alerts when it observes a significant
number of alerted peers or children, which is captured by the
attack containers of its children and peers.
VI. SIMULATION STUDY
We have implemented an event-based packet-level simulator
in C++ for the evaluation of our scheme. For each experiment,
we repeat it 10 times with different seeds and report the
average value as the final results. We use the number of
infected nodes as the metric for the evaluation.
A. Simulation Setup
We evaluate our scheme in a hierarchical network with four
levels. Nodes at each level have the same number of children
and number of peers. Links at each level will also be assigned
different delay. The parameters are shown in Table I.
B. Scenarios
We evaluate our scheme under three scenarios A,B and C.
In scenario A, the external vendor/attacker will pick ran-
domly a sensor to update/inject independent in which group
it resides 4. After the inject/update, he will wait for dexternal
time units before picking another sensor.
In scenario B, the external vendor will randomly pick a
group and then select a sensor in that group to inject/update.
After the inject/update, he will wait for dexternal time units
before picking another group that is not injected.
In scenario C, the external vendor will pick randomly a
subset of sensors to update/inject simultaneously. After each
inject/update, he will wait for dexternal time units before
picking another random subset.
In each scenario, the simulation will run until all sensors
are either in “ALERTED” or “INFECTED” state.
C. Results
Figure 4 and 5 show the number of infected nodes and
alerted nodes under the system with (and without) our scheme
in each scenario. The x-axes represents the delay of external
vendor dexternal and the y-axes is the number of infected
nodes when the simulation stops at time 500. As we can see
that, our scheme can reduce a significant number of infected
nodes under three scenarios.
VII. CONCLUSION
We just introduce the concept of attack container and
propose an attack container framework for large-scale attack
mitigation in hierarchical infrastructure. The concept of attack
container is important in the sense that it provides a uniform
view for each node about the behavior of its group as well as
other peer’s groups. This characteristic enables the distributed
detection and cooperative response capability.
We also give a protocol for cooperative response based on
our proposed framework. The simulation results clearly show
that our scheme can mitigate and contain large-scale attacks
under various scenarios.
4In this case, the vendor/attacker could pick multiple sensors in the same
group
Parameter Value Description
#Children [5,10,15] #children for each node at each level (fanout degree)
#Sensors 750 #sensors in the network
#Nodes 805 total #nodes in the network, including sensors and intermediate nodes
Children link weights [2.0, 1.0, 0.5] delays of link from parent to children at each level
Peers link weights [0, 2.0, 1.0, 0.5] delays of peer-to-peer link at each level
Simulation time 500 simulation time
Peer degree 50% 50% of nodes in the same level are connected peers
Default reporting rate 2 msgs / 1 time unit Default rate at which nodes report attack containers
Virus infection delay 1 time unit Delay a virus spends at infected sensor before infecting neighbor sensors (incubation time)
TABLE I
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Fig. 4. Number of infected sensors vs. delay of external vendor (dexternal) (time unit)
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Fig. 5. Number of alerted sensors vs. delay of external vendor (dexternal) (time unit)
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